

Rural culture in transition

Professor Toma Dorin ROMAN, PhD

The Bucharest University of Economic Studies

toma.roman@yahoo.com, Piata Romana nr. 6, Sector 1, Bucharest, Romania

ABSTRACT

The progress of the rural economic sector depends also on its cultural ground. A specific culture, that is open to the dynamic of the modern society facilitates the acquiring of new values and knowledge and incentivizes the knowledge transfer. Is the Romanian rural culture opened to such changes? This is a question that worth to seek an adequate answer.

Keywords: *rural community, values, knowledge, rural development*

Romanian villages are currently living a drama. The integration into the EU should potentiate the development of agriculture, the main economic activity and income source in rural areas. EU drained a series of stimulating funds to align them to the performance of other Member States. Romanian agriculture starts this “race” from multiple handicaps, some of them structural, such as low productivity and poor performance; some other of conjuncture, such as shortage of human resources in the context of massive emigration to the Western labor market. Overcoming or (at least) reducing the performance gap to the EU agriculture, which the EU incentive programs can only facilitate, should be based upon a unified and coherent agricultural strategy based on a thorough knowledge of the Romanian agriculture’s situation at present, and of the causes that led to it. Indeed, a simple comparative glance to labor productivity in agriculture both during the communist rule, and after 1990 indicates a yield of about 25-40% from the level achieved in Western countries’ agriculture, some of them having lower natural and human resources than Romania.

In Romanian agriculture it was achieved on average – for the entire period after the Second World War – 2,500 kg/ha for wheat, compared to 6,000-7,000 kg/ha in Western countries in EU; 1,900 to 2,000 l/cow/year compared to 5,500-7,000 l/cow/year in the same countries, etc. (Table 1, focused on synthetic indicator of productivity, i.e. the average yield per ha/animal, is relevant for these differences by comparing statistical data from Romania and some Western countries).

Romanian agriculture’s productivity is two to three times lower than in EU developed countries. In this perspective, it is clear that Romanian agriculture is unprepared to face the competition imposed by the participation in open Community market, the differences and deficits tend to rise despite pumping Community funds, and they managed poorly or selectively. If the next 5-10 years organizational disinterest and shortcomings of agricultural development will not be removed, the chronic character of low productivity will generate a major conflict status between the domestic producers and the foreign ones, including those willing to invest in this crucial sector of the economy.

Identifying the causes of the current low productivity of the Romanian agriculture is therefore a fundamental action to implement the recovery strategic project, knowing that cyclical, palliative measures merely extend an agonizing condition, already defined as chronic. These causes can be fully determined only if the necessary historical perspective is taken, allowing the delimitation of the evolutionary processes crossed by the Romanian

agriculture and their comparative definition within the more or less harsh situations they crossed. As a starting point of such an exercise of knowledge, the agrarian reform of 1921 can be taken, which changed the structure of farm type in Great Romania after World War I, when the trigger of a first process of transition to Western agriculture's performance criteria was set up.

The 1921 Land Reform policy was the consequence of administrative laws aimed at achieving "social justice" for the peasantry, the social status that led on its shoulders the weight of the "Wholeness of nation's war". Romanian peasants' sacrifices should be rewarded, the only way to mitigate its deep social discontentment being to satisfy the "land thirst". Land reform was not caused by economic criteria, but on social and political ones, interrupting the "natural" rural land ownership concentration that began after the reform initiated in 1864 under the reign of Alexandru Ioan Cuza. Following the Agrarian Law of 1921, over six million hectares (mostly contained in large properties) were divided by 3, 850,000 homeowners. It was so that nearly 90% of the country's arable land was used in systems with 1-3 ha. Generalization of small properties – with limited or reduced input of technical progress gains on the farm – resulted in maintaining low agricultural yields, comparable with the previous period of the First World War (See in this regard Table 2 in Appendix).

The legislation adopted after 1921 land reform aimed, from the same "social justice" perspective, to maintain the small property; to limit land transactions; to limit to max 5 hectares the allotment plots, not in favor of increased productivity and efficiency, possible only in consolidated environments or large properties, allowing rational exploitation. Small properties sustained for social and political reasons by most interwar governments suffered inevitable erosion due to spraying (mainly through the succession acts) and financial inability to stimulate technical progress, enabling the "machine" use in main farming works (plowing, sowing, threshing etc.).

The attempt to favor some cooperative association forms was incoherent, inconsistent and unsupported. The Land Law from 1937 and the decree from 1939 - proposed rather following a theoretical query of solutions to make the Romanian agriculture to "take off" – came in an absolutely unfavorable historical context, too late to have the necessary time to show fruit. The interwar small property, based on tradition and routine, kept the extensive, mainly grain farming character of the former great properties, which realized raw productions (wheat, corn, barley, livestock and skins etc.), of high volume for export with a low, but enough income to restart the process without huge difficulties. Small property could not afford even this option without possibility of alternative economic activities or keeping any "reserves" that could allow overcoming "route accidents" (economic crisis, natural contexts – droughts, floods, weather changes – etc.).

In this respect, it is exemplary the action of Moromete, the hero of the great novelist Marin Preda, who – based on the high price of wheat in the previous year – cultivated a large area with cereals, without realizing that – by virtue of the same reasoning – all the others peasants will do the same, resulting in a glut on the market and an inevitable fall of cereals price. In addition, in the interwar period, Romania ceased to be the "breadbasket of Europe", partially because the market has been overrun by the production of major agricultural powers (U.S., Canada, Argentina) and – on the other hand – because Western countries have failed – due to ownership concentration and massive introduction of technical progress – to solve most of their inner consumption. In this context, the production of small properties could come only in a very small proportion to the international trade circuit, being uncompetitive even in practicing dumping prices. World economic situation and the lack of appropriate strategies to

stimulate ownership concentration and to increase agriculture investment has led to conserve the “natural economy” traits of the Romanian agriculture; a subsistence agriculture in which the exploitation’s autarchic character is meant to provide all needs of the owner (farmer family). In this type of agrarian economy there is no question of effectiveness or productivity and profit form the invested efforts. The underdevelopment becomes endemic and the exploitation may fail at any time under the market pressure or as a result of natural or social bad circumstances.

One of these circumstances was the political situation after the Second World War. The soviet occupation and the propulsion of the totalitarian left (communist) power imposed a new agrarian reform (1945). The reform was clearly ideologically marked as one of the political tactics of the Communists to attract Romanian rural society in their project of social construction. The 1945 reform destroyed the large farms – wrongly called large estates – whose areas were limited to 100 ha in the hilly area and to 250 ha in the plain area by the 1921 Land Law. The reform emphasized spraying farm areas, maintaining absolute majority in an area of 5 hectares, not enough – as shown before – to achieve higher yields and higher returns. More serious is the fact that the “natural” ownership concentration was almost completely stopped, the communists quickly triggering the project of abolishing the private property in agriculture (1949). The nationalization and collectivization of the agriculture destroyed the structures of the Romanian agriculture property, set in over 100 years of history.

By nationalization and collectivization, 90% of the agricultural area of the country became the “property of all”, in fact the “property of none”. The state owned directly 30%; the remaining 60% were the property of the “collectivists”. The purpose of this forced trial was to grow the agricultural performance using on large areas the planned modern technology. Collectivization and nationalization of agriculture did not give the expected results; the growth was slow and fragile, made simultaneously with a drastic reduction of rural human resources, in the context of rapid industrialization of the country.

The process severely destabilized the Romanian village which lost its unique cultural traits and specific axiological universe without putting in place viable values of the specific modern civilization type. One consequence was the “rurbanization” phenomenon, by planting in urban areas some human groups, unprepared for this lifestyle. Social atomization reached a maximum, the organisms of the rural communities being replaced by the “lonely crowd”. Social effects of rapid transfer were complex and therefore difficult without economic goals to be achieved.

Of course, it can be raised the question whether the communist state was aware of the agriculture’s backward state and therefore sought to remedy the situation forcing a process of concentration of ownership which would occur much slower on a “natural” way? It is known that the great property promotes investment and resources which, with a proper management, are effective. For the communist state and party this reason was a secondary one. The inefficiency of the collectivist nationalized agriculture was already been tested in its origin country, URSS and the Romanian peasant’s “land thirst” was the predictable cause of failure for the process that “confiscated” his property – the source of his existence and his existential dignity.

The process initiated by the communists aimed, in fact to achieve a strong social control of the rural communities with somewhat independent evolution, the peasant “stuck on earth” building his own axiological universe less influenced by urban movements, the so-called “fortuna labilis”. Deprived of his natural communion with the earth – his natural surroundings and source of his symbolic horizon – the peasant becomes an “object of history”, a simply

statistic data, with depleted or even annulated creative resources, with reversed main values scale.

Economic failure of the nationalization and collectivization process can easily be seized on the basis of comparisons with the developments of other agricultural areas and even with the own situation of the Romanian agriculture (See Table 1). Although the number of tractors increased by 48 times compared to 1938, the amount of chemical fertilizers by 200 times, the irrigated areas by 19.2 times, average yields per hectare increased only by 1-1.5 tons cereal crops (wheat and corn). The state has set 573 SMAs and a large number of specialists were assigned in agriculture – an average of 35.5 per IAS and 6.5 per CAP. For this purpose, specialized education was developed and agricultural research units and laboratories were set up in counties. With such a material and technical base and the existent number of specialists, the large areas agriculture (on 5.7 to 7.0 thousand ha per IAS and 1.1-2.0 thousand ha per CAP) should achieve a level of performance similar to that of the Western agriculture. But this level has never been achieved and the productivity – in absolute terms – fell just below the interwar Romanian agriculture. The main cause was the peasant's dispossession of land ownership, his return to an exploitation of somehow holding type, which in its time assured the users' subsistence and some surplus for the domain's master. Deprived of his work object, without even his own means (passed to the state or the collective ownership), the Romanian peasant was no more interested in traditional, rational utilization of his world resources, accepting – in spite of his millennial economic spirit – the waste and disinterest and even practicing a kind of "piracy" on the results of his work, that he could no more enjoy.

Elimination of private property in agriculture eliminated its natural concentration, eliminated the private initiative interest stimulated by its own free market competition which didn't exist any more. Reduced to a simple stage of "speaking tools", the peasants ceased to act like responsible stewards of their own fortunes, the exploitation management was taken over by state officials with a very limited field of administrative initiatives. Facing the state omnipotence and the "state plan", even the specialists must accept absurd development projects, aberrant and inefficient investments. Political dirigisme blocked and destroyed the economic initiative, positive mercantile spirit and, in the same time, the rural symbolic universe, peasants replacing the former "running off from estates" with "running to the cities", whose consequences were partially listed.

In Western agriculture, farms average area led directly or in association by their owners could adopt by own initiative some specific investment strategies, could – with the necessary risks – be guided by the effects of competition alleged by it. In the statist and collectivist controlled agriculture of Romania, such type of development was excluded. At the end of the twentieth century, Romanian agriculture's disaster was already a foretold one...

The overthrow of the communism in 1989 did not lead automatically to the opening of new "taking off" directions in agriculture. In fact, the restitution legislation and the reconstruction of former land ownership (achieved after many delays and "amendments" of the communist regime's "heirs") put the Romanian farm in the situation in which it was before the totalitarian historical parenthesis and led it back more than a half century.

Western countries' agriculture didn't dance, all this time, the back steps. At the beginning of the third millennium, Romanian agriculture found itself in the context of resuming normal ownership concentration process as private property, as a basis for effective exploitation and use – under the pressure of the free market competition – of technical progress, market strategies, agricultural management and knowledge transfer. In the situation of lacking funds and facilities – those taken by or introduced under the communist regime being obsolete or completely worn out – a chaotic, selective or even malevolent use of

European funds, to restart the natural development process was extremely difficult and, sometimes, alienate for the rural Romanian inhabitants. Romanian village entrance into modernity, rural destabilization of human resources and their massive migration to other cultural and economic horizons will finally crumble the basic cell, the typical peasant family, the economic, cultural and political habits, in other words – the typical specific ideals. The Romanian peasant, forced by the “hard times” to migrate to Europe, will adapt, in principle, to his new living environment, evolving on a way described by William Thomas and Florian Znaniecki in their famous work “The Polish Peasant in Europe and America”.

But if the “peasants’ end” – to use an expression of the well-known French sociologist Henri Mendras – is predictable (the pressure of the communist model of urbanization being regarded as the last lethal stroke upon the rural universe), the agriculture as a key sector must survive for the sake of the nation and become effective in order to withstand to the blind competition generated by meeting on the Community market with other domestic agricultures.

There are several ways of achieving, on the foundation of private property, farm performance. On sized surfaces (80-100 ha for cereals and technical plants, 10-15 ha for fruit trees or vines, 8-10 ha for vegetables, 20-50 ha head of cattle for milk, 30-40 million pigs etc.) with adequate facilities, by selling specialized products (in various degrees of processing), individually or jointly (through participatory associations – such as holdings – placed alongside with those of specific tourism or craft) may generate a rapid recovery of the Romanian agriculture and its integration in the overall farming system assumed by the EU. It should be, however, from this perspective, a strong political will (embodied in legislative initiatives favorable to the agriculture), and a real responsibility in the use of structural development funds and investment orientation, consistent and functional organization systems and agricultural credit insurance, an effective orientation and agricultural training, including knowledge transfer.

Developing a pool of performing farms cannot be achieved within the more than nine millions hectares returned to the private ownership without a legislative support to block the natural process of spraying small properties. Romanian society integrated into the EU cannot afford to wait for natural transition, after the initial rural ownership spraying, to a concentration of the rural property – a slow action, realized after several contradictory manifestations in the Western states. Merging various plots of various owners – even before the cadastre and land organization – with divisibility exclusion on various transactions or inheritance – of the unincorporated territories could be a prerequisite for increasing the efficiency of rural activities. For holdings constituted by “block” sale of private lots or by proportional association of small properties, an organized directed agricultural credit, more rigorous than the existing one, should be set up to favor (on the basis of available material guarantee criteria, judicious preparation, obtainable objective), by buying land and optimal size of technical working means, the development at an optimal size, necessary to enter in the market generated competition. Optimal holdings would reduce in 15-20 years direct employment in agricultural production from 35% of all employment in the country, to 10-15% compared to 5-7% in the rest of the EU. HR surplus thus obtained could be assigned to the alternative activities providing comprehensive development of rural areas.

Farm efficiency is easily to be achieved in the case of state agricultural ownership (the former IAS). Various commercial companies (former IAS) hold about 1 million hectares in large surfaces, erratically exploited on arbitrary projects, as it always happens with state properties. These large farms could be divided into medium-sized farms, equipped with relevant technical means, with a commercial goal. Their privatization or renting should be

directed to the farmers presenting valid feasibility projects and material and professional competences to withstand the competition imposed by the market. Overall privatization or lease of large state-owned farms is counterproductive because, at least virtually, it reduces the required competition performance by creating conditions of local monopolies, inevitably tented to dominate the market and to seize the gross farm efficiency. Former IAS have, beside assets of aver 1 million ha, huge movable and immovable capital, tempting the interests groups or current political power's clientele to pursuit their fraudulent liquidation, including the transfer to foreign investors, less interested in Romanian rural society - by speculative operations and establishing phantom companies. An interesting and coherent set of proposals on how to transform the state agricultural properties is set up by Dr. Eng. Hilary Isaac (in "Romanian Agriculture", paper published in 1999 by PROPACT, the National Union of Romanian Peasants), based on seizing different socio-economic trends in rural area, which are valid even today. Based on historical data and trends compared between the Western and Romanian agriculture, the researcher proposes the following:

1. Delimitation, within the large scale farms, of viable medium exploitations which can ensure commercial agricultural production by using modern techniques (80-100 ha for grain farms – technical plants, 10-15 ha for orchards or vineyards, 8-10 ha of vegetables, 15-35 heads milk cattle etc.).

2. Transfer of these medium farms through sale, lease or concession to a first generation of private farmers, according to special criteria (age, training, criminal record, material guarantees, etc.) stipulated in a special legislation.

3. The main advantage for the national economy is the immediate establishment on the IAS 1 million ha of tend of thousands of private farms of optimal production size, similar to those in Western countries (where it took several decades to concentrate small properties).

4. The competition between them, to which the 8-9 million ha of the small properties will be also involved, will trigger the concentration of land ownership which within 15-20 years can provide 10-15% of villages' specialized agricultural producers (from the now existing 34%), the rest of the inhabitants (because the villages should not be depopulated) will be involved in related activities (processing, services, packaging etc.).

5. Setting up the production capacity of various existing IAS facilities (where not yet robbed) at the center level of business or farms (storage, processing, meat, vegetables, fruit, grapes etc.), in the nuclei of cooperative group associations, that should integrate with the exploitations resulted from IAS farms restructuring and private holdings in the area, which will gradually arise through land concentration and specialization in certain crops (products).

6. It is useful that the legislation treats equally and contains provisions concerning the unit production capacities of the former ILF, IPILF, Vinalcool, ICIL etc., who are currently unused and deteriorating.

7. It should be avoided altogether the formal privatization type carried out in industry, with thousands of shareholders.

8. The purpose of privatization should be to trigger the initiatives, the interest, the responsibility, the competition etc.

9. A fruit tree farm, for example, of 200 ha owned by the state, privatized with a **single owner** ensure the installation of all the market economy precepts or, according to the **MEBO** system (**PAS**), with **all employees**, will have no effect upon performance while owned by 10-15 people.

10. The holdings "auctions" should in no case be based upon the financial strength, but the criteria to ensure that the person who will become the owner (leser) will put into practice

his own work (and his family work) and that he is capable of the appropriate performance to ensure an increase of 2-3 times the actual results.

In conclusion, account should be taken, having the experience of two socio-economic systems (capitalist and socialist), in the last 5-7 decades of the last century, that **the performance is not possible to be achieved with officials, but only by owners.**

At their turn, the “associative forms” and the agricultural associations organized under Law 36/1991 have nothing to do with the market economy. What mechanisms can act so that the yields increase by 2-3 times those realized by a CAP on the same land?

The associations are exploitation forms so that the earth does not remain uncultivated; they are not forms to ensure increased performance – the main objective of any agricultural strategy.

Formation of middle size property in Romania is conditional (along with previously mentioned factors), upon:

- Constitutional **guaranteeing private property and the right to be its first defender**
- Providing facilities for the purchase of agricultural machinery to farmers in training and professionals – entrepreneurs to create private agricultural services, of medium or small size (not monopoly)
- Establishing a rational structure of the Romanian agricultural production in terms of its European Union integration, to guide the agricultural profile of the forming holdings
- Immediate organization by separation from IAS or public patrimony domain of optimum size farms to be transferred (through sale, lease, rent) to specialists who will operate on a private basis in order to serve as model farm on various production profiles
- Design and realization of a rural development policy, of a **network of small – medium enterprises capacity for better use of the agricultural, horticultural, livestock production** (Module – Annex for fruit and vegetables). Without the perspective of profitable recovery of production, no specialized commercial farms can be formed
- The production structure of the Romanian agriculture - mainly cereals – must be reconsidered, by developing greater intensive crops. It is not understandable how, in a country where more than 34% of the population works in agriculture, the wheat crop – the most extensive one – 100% mechanized and with a low yield, around 2,500 kg/ha, with uninsured sale, is stimulated (by seeds, incentives etc.)?
- Based on specific criteria, it is necessary that private farms of optimal size, with commercial production be included in the SME category, enjoying their stimulating regulations
- Within the Agriculture Ministry, a service, a direction, if not more, should be officially intended to set and track the establishment policy of medium farms in Romania – the single way to ensure performance, to increase agricultural productivity
- Introduction in the agricultural education curricula, since 2008-2009, the discipline “organization of the private farm” instead “socialist organization” which, under other names, is still in use
- Rethink and modernize the Romanian village as a matrix of a prosperous economy, of commercial production and processing, in which the market economy laws have free action field
- The Romanian village and peasant problem should no longer be simplistic addressed, meaning in which way is he working the land: individually or “edged” in an association, the substantive issue is whether the Romanian peasant must continue to live on the rent (income) that lies in 2.5 hectares of land?! In other words, **small farmers (34% of the active population) should be “saved” keeping them in poverty?**

*
* *

The diagnosis and the proposals configured by Prof. Hilary Isaac are focused on recovery of the Romanian agriculture, including socio-economic revitalization of rural areas. After EU integration, these targets became stringent, compulsory requirements. With some coherent agricultural policies and some stimulating structural funds offered by the EU, they can be realized in a more or less rapid rhythm. Agriculture modernization and rise of an efficient farmers category, adapted to the European market demands – an inevitable process – will lead to dissolution of the peasant cultural universe, to the "end" of peasants"

The Romanian village was, since immemorial times, the creator and deposit of an specific axiological universe, the basement of the fundamental ethnic personality, but, under the times' pressure, its existence ended. Instead of the specific characteristics of some related small communities, imposed also by the special jointly organizational forms, the characteristics (surprised by F. Tönnies in "Community and Society" – 1887) of the global society in which convention, money, obligations' right and political structure have an essential role are more and more pregnant. The process is, probably irreversible and necessary. But, for a society raised up on the cultural ground of the rural, sometimes even against it, as it happened in the Romanian society, maintaining – not only in the "collective memory" – its values and traditions becomes an essential duty. We cannot know when to appeal to this identity definition would become – in the world dynamic – necessary.

Table 1 Average production in different countries, per hectar, per animal

Product	Year	M. U.	Romani a	Franc e	Holan d	Denmar k	Italy	USA	Russia	German y	Austria	Belgium	
Wheat	1979-1981	kg/ha	2487	4991	6280	5135			1424	4799	3783	5031	
	1991-2001		2355	6517	7897	6740			U.3445	6406	5018	6648	
Corn	1979-1981	kg/ha	3157	5455	12910	-	5538	6474	2996	6165	7047	6297	
	1991-2001		2910	7776	25000	-	4634	6568	U.2675	7450	7651	8381	
Potatoes	1979-1981	kg/ha	14728	28465	37752	26904	18261	30229	11095	23587	25387	39246	
	1991-2001		11579	34495	42006	33077	21273	35330	U.12795	33161	22776	39122	
Sugar beet	1979-1981	kg/ha	21723	52381	49252	40148	48563	46198	19732	41703	49907	54798	
	1991-2001		19242	68319	63500	49799	46259	44582	U.20789	50562	51340	58827	
Grapes	1979-1981	kg/ha	5798	8803	244470	-	9345	15990	7337	10153	7220	9520	
	1991-2001		4361	7469	15552	-	10132	17294	U.4729	15307	7163	8742	
			Romani a	Franc e	Holan d	Denmar k	Suiss	Swede n	Israel	N.Koree a	S.Koree a	German y	Russi a
Milk	1979-1981	l/year/cow	1914	3807	5052	4920	4194	5257	6817	2244	4864	4178	2097
	1991-2001		1907	5107	6260	6424	5035	6152	9163	2356	6623	5078	2267R
			Romani a	Franc e	Holan d	Belgium	Italy	German y					
Fruits	1979-1981	kg/ha	4200	16530	18550	17340	15400	14200					
Total	1991-		6040	21850	25150	22300	20500	18500					

	2001										
--	------	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--

FAO

Table 2

Structure of land ownership of EU farms (1995)

A. Number of exploitations per classes of dimension (Thou.)

Country	Class							Total
	under 5 ha	5-10 ha	12-20 ha	20-30 ha	30-50 ha	50-100 ha	Over 100 ha	
EU 15	4171,3	955,5	780,3	412,7	435,1	370,8	214,7	7 341
EU 12	4052,4	881,4	682,0	360,6	391,5	346,5	205,5	6 932
Belgium	23,7	10,2	12,7	9,0	9,4	5,0	0,8	71
Denmark	2,1	11,4	14,9	10,4	12,9	12,1	5,0	68
Germany	179,2	84,0	100,0	64,0	69,3	51,6	19,9	558
Greece	580,9	118,2	52,4	13,1	8,1	2,6	0,7	773
Spain	706,4	111,6	147,2	60,5	54,7	51,7	45,4	1 277
France	20,9	69,6	88,5	65,3	109,0	128,2	70,3	734
Ireland	14,9	20,5	40,6	29,1	23,1	16,1	4,1	153
Italy	1938,3	253,1	140,2	58,8	45,5	25,9	13,4	2 482
Luxemburg	0,8	0,3	0,3	0,2	0,5	1,0	0,2	3
Holland	37,4	18,1	20,8	15,0	14,8	6,2	0,9	113
Austria	87,3	41,7	49,0	21,5	14,2	5,2	2,8	227
Portugal	345,5	51,9	28,3	8,5	6,5	4,4	5,4	456
Finland	10,5	17,9	30,3	19,1	16,2	6,0	0,8	101
Sweden	11,0	15,5	19,0	11,4	13,3	13,0	5,6	88
UK	32,3	29,5	26,1	23,8	32,7	40,9	39,3	234

B. Agricultural area, per classes of dimension of farms

Country	Class							Total	Average area of a farm (ha)
	under 5 ha	5-10 ha	12-20 ha	20-30 ha	30-50 ha	50-100 ha	over 100 ha		
	Thousand hectares								
EU 15	7278,5	6701,3	11040,1	10058,1	15741,9	25604,8	50937,5	128 370	17,5
EU 12	7010,5	6154,8	9622,4	8798,9	15081,0	23980,8	4947,2	119 693	17,4
Belgium	45,5	73,2	166,1	222,3	257,0	331,3	122,0	1 337	18,8
Denmark	4,1	82,8	216,4	254,0	501,7	836,3	831,4	2 725	40,0
Germany	397,8	605,3	1457,3	1574,5	2540,5	3505,0	6977,0	14 155	25,6
Greece	1053,6	793,1	709,3	309,2	295,9	167,3	125,4	3 464	4,5
Spain	1408,8	1459,5	2032,0	1459,1	2095,0	3594,3	13193,7	25 230	19,8
France	404,4	499,0	1283,6	1680,5	4255,5	8969,0	11174,2	28 057	38,2
Ireland	45,0	155,9	596,2	714,4	1084,7	1081,1	648,2	4 325	28,1
Italy	2890,1	1778,9	1927,3	1418,5	1751,5	1829,2	3089,8	14 685	5,9
Luxemburg	1,5	2,0	3,8	5,2	18,3	68,5	27,6	125	41,7
Holland	77,4	129,1	301,6	368,3	550,2	42,4	159,9	1 995	17,7
Austria	202,3	303,3	707,3	521,6	534,3	335,6	820,8	3 425	15,1
Portugal	595,9	360,3	388,7	207,2	249,4	299,2	1823,0	3 924	8,6
Finland	33,2	133,0	444,1	467,6	610,5	391,0	112,4	2 191	21,7
Sweden	32,5	110,2	266,3	280,0	516,1	897,5	957,1	3 059	34,8
UK	75,4	216,7	519,9	586,6	1279,3	2896,4	10875,1	16 449	70,3